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ABSTRACT
The Longbow HELLFIRE Hardware in the Loop Lot Acceptance Plan is one of
the first attempts by the U.S. Army to defray the costs associated with formal lot
acceptance testing by utilizing a non-destructive Hardware in the Loop computer
simulation. Because this type of lot acceptance testing is relatively new to the
Army, determining the best approach and methodology to use will be critical not
only to Longbow HELLFIRE, but to all follow-on systems that could potentially
utilize this form of testing in the future. This thesis analyzes the structure, nature
and assumptions that were used to develop this Hardware in the Loop plan to
determine the essential parts of this form of testing and the problems and issues
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A primary goal of this thesis is to analyze the Longbow
HELLFIRE system, the Hardware in the Loop simulation
methodology and the statistical properties of lot acceptance
testing for the Army Material Command (AMC) . This methodology
will be compared to the existing HELLFIRE II "Fly to Buy"




1. Missile System Description.
The Longbow HELLFIRE Modular Missile System (LBHMMS)
is an integral part of the AH-64D helicopter weapon system,
which is designed to defeat multiple armored ground targets
and several selected air targets, through the process of radar
acquisition targeting and ground engagement (see Figure #1)
.
The LBHMMS consists of:
• Longbow HELLFIRE Modular Missile.
• Longbow HELLFIRE Launcher.
• Longbow Missile Container.
• Longbow Training Missile.
• Radome Environmental Cover.
FIRE AND FORGET HELLRRE
MMW FCR AND SEEKER (LOBL/LOAL)
ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY
GREATER RANGE THAN HELLFIRE
V
Figure 1 Longbow HELLFIRE System Description
In addition, a missile telemetry sub-system will be
designed and used during flight testing of several of the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Longbow
missiles 1 .
Tactical Missile Description. The LBHMMS consists of an active
Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar guidance section mated to a
HELLFIRE II missile bus. The Longbow missile warhead is a
High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) weapon that employs a radar
aided inertial guidance system. The bus consists of a warhead
section, a propulsion section, and a control section (see
Figure #2) . The LBHMMS is capable of either a Lock-On-Before-
Launch (LOBL) Mode or a Lock-On-After-Launch (LOAL) Mode which
describes the two methods in which a target can be engaged by
the Longbow Missile. These are the major components and
functions that will be referred to through out this thesis.
2. Launch Platforms.
The AH-64D Helicopter is the primary launch platform
envisioned for the LBHMMS. The LBHMMS will provide the AH-64D
and other airborne launch platforms with a fire-and- forget
capability for engaging targets handed over from the Longbow
Fire Control Radar (FCR) or its functional equivalent systems,
such as the Tactical Air Designation System (TADS) , Airborne
Target Handoff System (ATHS) and the Integrated Helmet and
1 For additional information concerning the Longbow















































TACTTCAL WEIGHT: 107.6 13.
DIAMETER: 7 IN.
Pigure 2 Longbow HELLFIRE Tactical Missile
Display Site System (IHADSS) . Future variants may also
include a ground launch platform in addition to the airborne
platforms described above.
C . BACKGROUND .
For the past several decades, the U.S. Army has required
virtually all existing tactical missile systems, be purchased
only after a representative sample of missiles from each lot,
the production lot, has been successfully tested to confirm
specified performance requirements. The purpose of such lot
acceptance testing plans is to provide a qualitative
assessment of missile system reliability for the entire lot
and to provide an accept/reject decision rule for the entire
lot of missiles. Under this procedure, the contractor only
delivers and gets paid for, those lots that pass this
acceptance test.
The "Fly to Buy" acceptance methodology, by its very
nature, requires that these sample missile systems be fired in
a scenario that represents the actual or anticipated
requirement that the missile system would be likely to
encounter under actual battlefield conditions. This
inevitably results in the missile being destroyed while
verifying that it is functioning properly.
Until recently, the technical complexity of the missile
system and the cost associated with performing "Fly to Buy"
testing was not large enough to cause rethinking of the
process. However, increasing costs of missile systems and
declining defense resources are forcing a re-evaluation of
this type of destructive lot acceptance testing. Other more
cost-effective testing methods must be found to determine the
quality of missile lots.
One possible alternative to this problem is to assess the
missile's quality through tests involving computer
simulations. This process known as Hardware -in -the -Loop
(HWIL) testing, attempts to simulate the flight of the missile
without actually requiring it to be fired or destroyed. In
this case the actual sample missile would be attached to a
computer via a cable tied to as many of the key components of
the system as safely practical. A computer simulation of an
actual acceptance test scenario could then be run that
exercises the missile in a manner similar to an actual live
firing against a specified target. The computer collects the
data, analyzes them and assesses the results in terms of the
lot acceptance criteria.
No specific Government methodology exists that addresses
the prospect of simulating missile fights via this HWIL
process for lot acceptance. Currently there is no other Army
millimeter wave HWIL facility which can accommodate "live"
missile rounds. This would require the construction of a
separate facility that could perform this type of testing.
D. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and evaluate the
current Longbow HELLFIRE Lot Acceptance Plan against the
conventional "Fly to Buy" methodologies to determine what
advantages have been gained using a HWIL simulation for this
process and what still remains to be accomplished in order to
use this new process effectively.
E. APPROACH.
Because the Longbow HELLFIRE Quality Assurance Lot
Verification Test (QALVT) plan is a one of a kind test plan
that still is in its draft form, it will be necessary to
consider past plans that preceded it to fully understand and
appreciate the advantages it presents.
The approach used in conducting this analysis involves
first providing the background information leading up to the
establishment of an HWIL simulation method. This will be
discussed and provided in Chapters I & II. Next the
traditional "Fly to Buy" methodology will be discussed in
Chapter III, to provide the reader with a basis of
understanding of the key requirements involved in conducting
prior lot acceptance testing and the whole lot acceptance
procedure in general. This will also serve to outline the
development of the HWIL simulation method.
The current draft HWIL Simulation Plan will be introduced
in Chapter IV, and its differences highlighted from its
predecessor the "Fly to Buy" methodology. In Chapter V the
HWIL simulation method is analyzed to quantify its benefits
and deficiencies. A conclusion to the analysis is provided in
Chapter VI. Finally, in Chapter VII, suggested modifications
and alternatives (including possible contractual language) of
the HWIL methodology are discussed.
II THE NEED FOR HARDWARE IN THE LOOP (HWIL) ACCEPTANCE
TESTING
A. BACKGROUND.
In FY 1992, the Air- to-Ground Missile System (AGMS)
Project Office, which includes HELLFIRE, HELLFIRE II, and
Longbow HELLFIRE, solicited a proposal from the United States
Army Test and Experimentation Command, Redstone Technical Test
Center (USATECOM RTTC) to develop an alternative method for
performing lot acceptance testing on Longbow HELLFIRE Missiles
during Low- Rate Production and subsequent Full -Rate
Production. Prior lot acceptance testing had been performed
exclusively through the use of "Fly to Buy" (FTB) methodology,
where a lot sample of 4 to 10 missiles per month were flight
tested at Eglin AFB to determine acceptance or rejection for
the remainder of the missiles in each lot. In the intervening
years between the production of HELLFIRE II and the
development of Longbow HELLFIRE, there has been a significant
rise in the unit cost of each missile round. The conventional
"Fly to Buy" lot acceptance program would require considerable
additional resources. An HWIL simulation based testing
program will reduce the lot acceptance testing costs.
9
B. UNITED STATES ARMY MISSILE COMMAND (USAMICOM) POLICY #
702-5.
The Commanding General of USAMICOM has directed that
weapon system acquisition planning will consider the principal
items expressed in Quality Assurance Lot Verification Testing
(QALVT) before making a final determination as to what type of
requirements will be included in the final missile lot
acceptance plan. The contents of this directive was set forth
in MICOM POLICY No. 702-5, dated 16 May 1990.
The application of this policy is based on three principal
decision factors: 1) unit cost of missile less than or equal
to $ 200k, 2) production rate of at least 50 units per month,
3) estimated QALVT less than 5% of the procurement cost (see
Figures # 3, 4, & 5, U.S. Army QALVT decision Criteria) 2 .
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND TRADE-OFFS.
The Air to Ground Missile System (AGMS) Project Office and
USATECOM RTTC have performed an analysis of the perspective
factors and trade-offs involved in implementing a HWIL lot
acceptance program versus a traditional "Fly to Buy" (FTB)
program.
This analysis considered the two alternatives available to
Longbow HELLFIRE (LBHF) as well as the historical data
provided by the earlier HELLFIRE I. In all cases, it was
assumed that all FTB flight testing would be conducted at
US Army Missile Command Policy #702-5, 16 May 1990
10
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Figure 4 MICOM Policy #702-5, Decision Criteria (cont.)
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QUALITY ASSURANCE LOT VERIFICATION TESTING (QALVT)
CRITERIA FOR MEETING "DIAMOND A" (WHICH ALLOWS PROGRESSION
TO THE NEXT STEP IN THE QALVT LOGIC DIAGRAM)
1
.
QUALITY PROGRAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH MIL-Q-9858.
2. GOVERNMENT APPROVED STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL (SPC).
3. SUPPLIER RATING PROGRAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH MIL-STD-1535.
4. LAST PRODUCT ORIENTED SURVEY (POS) SCORED GREATER THAN 8.0.
5. NO CATEGORY 1 QUALITY DEFICIENCY REPORT (QDR) RECHVED IN
THE LAST 12 MONTHS.
6. SIX OR LESS CATEGORY 2 QDRs RECEIVED IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS.
7. NO MAJOR HARDWARE DESIGN CHANGES (SUCH AS PRODUCT
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS) SINCE THE START OF QALVT STEP 1
.
8. TEN OR FEWER MAJOR OR CRITICAL RFDs/RFWs DURING LAST 12
MONTHS.
9. NO MAJOR CHANGES IN FACILITIES, TOOLING, TEST EQUIPMENT OR
PRODUCTION PROCESSES SINCE THE START OF QALVT STEP 1
.
10. RECEIVING INSPECTION YIELDS GREATER THAN 93 PERCENT DURING
THE LAST SIX MONTHS.
1 1
.
IN-PROCESS INSPECTION YIELDS GREATER THAN 93 PERCENT DURING
THE LAST SIX MONTHS.
12. INTERNAL CONTRACTOR QUALITY AUDIT DATA ARE AVAILABLE TO
THE GOVERNMENT AND CONTRACTOR AGREES TO UNANNOUNCED
GOVERNMENT AUDITS.
13. MISSILES ARE WARRANTED.
14. NO POST-ACCEPTANCE FLIGHT FAILURES OF WARRANTED MISSILES.
NOTE: ITEMS 1 THROUGH 14 ABOVE ARE PROVIDED FOR GUIDANCE AND
MAY BE MODIFIED OR CHANGED THROUGH CONTRACT NEGOTIATION.
Figure 5 MICOM Policy 702-5 Decision Criteria (cont.)
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Eglin Air Force Base (EAFB)
; Alabama. The primary factors
inthe development of the assumptions involved in this analysis
process -were as follows:
Unit Costs:
• HELLFIRE cost per missile $ 20k
• Longbow HELLFIRE (LBHF) cost per missile $ 300k




• HELLFIRE Lot Acceptance Testing: (FTB) @ 4-10
missiles per month.
• Longbow HELLFIRE (LBHF) Lot Acceptance Testing:
(FTB) @ 4-10 missiles per month.
• Longbow HELLFIRE HWIL Simulation: 4 live fires per year
and up to 20 missiles simulated flight testing per month.
Facilities
:
• Facility for the HWIL Simulation: $ 5.8 million (a one
time cost) . The actual building and
instrumentation.
Labor:
• Personnel needed to run this facility for one year:
14
estimated at approximately $0.8 million.
With these factors in mind, a trade-off analysis was
performed using costs for four missiles with the results
portrayed in Table 2-1 Production/Acceptance Analysis 3 .
The total savings projected under a HWIL simulation lot
acceptance test program would represent cost savings of $13.55
million per year over a conventional "Fly to Buy" program.
Even including the $5.8 million necessary for providing for
the HWIL simulation facility, the payback period under this




in $ millions per year)
HELLFIRE FTB LBHF FTB HWIL SIM.
MISSILE COST 1 $1.15 $14.40 $1.20
EAFB SUPPORT $0.72 $0.72 $0.06
RTTC SUPPORT $0.53 $0.53 $0.44
SYS. SIM SUPPORT $0.00 $0.00 $0.40
TOTAL $2.40 $15.65 $2.10
Notes: 1. HWIL SIM. missile costs represent the ; cost of hook-
up and processing of sample missiles through the
computer test facility and returning them to their
original configuration.
The HELLFIRE FTB column indicates approximately what AGMS
pays per year for the HELLFIRE I "Fly to Buy" program, and
also indicates where the true cost growth in FTB actually
lies, namely, missile cost. This total amount includes
3 Johnson, J., Memorandum for AGMS, "All Up Round Test
Facility", 18 April 1994.
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missile cost, range support, and pre- flight support. The
Longbow HELLFIRE "Fly to Buy" column indicates what the cost
would be if the AGMS Office implemented a similar "Fly to Buy"
program with just four missiles per month, even though this
method might require up to ten missiles to complete.
D. HWIL SIMULATION REQUIREMENTS.
The requirements imposed on the HWIL facility by AGMS are
as follows:
• Functional checkouts of hardware and software inter-
operability of the missile.
• Test must provide a confidence equal or better than FTB,
that missile lots are good or bad.
• Must be non-destructive.
• Must perform testing at the All -Up-Round (AUR) level.
• Must consider environmental conditioning.
• Number of required missiles must be significantly lower.
Testing at the All -Up-Round level, refers to conducting a
test at the complete, assembled system level. AUR would not
allow components of the system to be disassembled to
accommodate testing.
The facility required for HWIL testing would also have to
have specific requirements. These would include the following
items
:




• Capable of Vibration & Environmental testing.
• Capable of handling a Longbow HELLFIRE All Up Round (AUR)
.
• Meet safety requirements.
Provide cost effective operation.
E. THE SIMULATION/TEST ACCEPTANCE FACILITY.
The Simulation/Test Acceptance Facility (STAF) is the
Hardware- in- the Loop facility being developed at RSA by the
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (USATECOM) Redstone
Technical Test Center (RTTC) and the U.S. Army Missile Command
(USAMICOM) and System Simulation and Development Directorate
(SSDD) . This facility is the only facility in the U.S.
capable of performing nondestructive HWIL tests on "live"
production and developmental missiles at the millimeter wave
frequencies. A diagram of the facility is shown at Figure 6.
This facility is currently under construction at RSA on the
north-eastern side of Test Area #1. This facility includes
the following equipment, buildings and hardware:
1. Bunker.
This structure is approximately 2,000 square feet that
features a test item room, a test chamber and a computer room.
The test item room contains the compact missile test set and
the environmental chamber for conditioning missile rounds
prior to testing. The test chamber contains the missile under
17



































Figure 6 Simulation/Test Acceptance Facility Layout
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test, the Three Axis Rotational Flight Simulator (TARFS)
,
anechoic chamber, and the target generator horns of the
millimeter wave target simulator. The computer room contains
the target generation equipment and instrumentation, telemetry
instrumentation, simulation computer, and the data analysis
terminals (for inert rounds) . There will be a roll -up door in
this structure facing down range that will allow actual target
acquisition and tracking, if desired, down the long axis of
the TA-l range. This will allow the actual tracking of a
variety of real world target vehicles with actual production
missiles, at ranges up to approximately 6km.
2. Target Generator.
The target generator system will intercept the
millimeter wave signal transmitted by the missile, delay the
signal in time to simulate the range to the target, tap delay
the signal to simulate target range extent, place proper
doppler shift on the signal to compensate for relative
movement and return the signal to the missile in real-time on
a pulse for pulse basis.
3. Three Axis Rotational Flight Simulator (TARFS).
The TARFS will provide a mounting structure for the
missile in the test chamber. It will additionally provide
real-time missile flight motion in pitch, yaw, and roll to
simulate the missile's actual fly out to the target along its
own trajectory. The missile fin position will be monitored
19
and fed back into the simulation in order to control the TARFS
position.
4. Telemetry.
All missile and STAF data will be collected and time
tagged to allow for a real time "quick look" and post mission
data analysis.
5. The Simulation Computer System.
The simulation computer system will consist of two
computer systems; a control computer and a modeling computer.
The control computer will run the 6 Degrees Of Freedom (6-DOF)
program, facility control software, perform inputs and outputs
to the modeling computer and interacts with the user. The
modeling computer simulates the complex signature of the
target subject using parallel processing techniques.
6. Compact Missile Test Set.
This test set will perform the majority of the open
loop testing and characterization of each missile round prior
to entering into simulation testing. This test set will
expose obvious flaws or defects in each missile prior to this
testing and prevent wasting valuable simulation time on
defective rounds.
20
Ill THE EXISTING "PLY TO BUY" METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION.
The purpose of the "Fly to Buy" Methodology is to
determine within an acceptable level of statistical
confidence, that the Government is purchasing (in lot size
quantities) a product that is reasonably reliable and defect
free. In the case of missile procurement, this is usually
accomplished after destructively testing the lot sample and
comparing the results against pre-established acceptance
criteria. The sample size required to accomplish this task is
related to the lot size and the confidence interval required.
Since most missile systems tend to be quite expensive, this
can be very costly in the long run. Consequentially, a
sequential sampling plan is usually developed that reduces the
average number of missiles tested yet satisfies the
requirements. These plans are divided into several stages
which specify a certain quantity and an acceptance/rejection
criteria. Often these plans, depending on the lot size and
confidence required, will specify that testing be continued
and that another stage of testing be conducted up to a pre-
determined quantity. At the end of the final stage, a
decision will be made to accept or reject the lot and no other
testing will be continued for the lot.
21
B. THE HELLFIRE LOT ACCEPTANCE PROGRAM.
1. Purpose.
The purpose of the HELLFIRE Lot Acceptance Program is
to provide confidence that HELLFIRE missiles meet the
specified performance and reliability requirements of the
production contract 4 .
2. Background.
a. Sampling Plan Characteristics
.
This plan is intended to provide a method for
performing lot acceptance by prescribing an Acceptable Quality
Level (AQL) for the production process. This AQL is used to
determine the sample size for the sampling inspection. The
AQL is the largest allowable percent of defective items of a
satisfactory process average. This sampling plan and its AQL
are chosen in accordance with the risk assumed, as defined in
the contract. Thus, the AQL is the designated value of
percent defective for which lots will be accepted most of the
time by the sampling procedure to be used. The sampling plan
is usually arranged so that the probability of rejecting a lot
when the process average is at the designated AQL value is not
larger than a preassigned small value (eg. 0.10) . This is the
producer's risk. The producer's risk may vary slightly with
the sample size.
4 The HELLFIRE II Modular Missile System QALVT Plan,
USAMICOM, July 1989, is the primary source of information for
this chapter.
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Jb. Operating Characteristics Curves.
In military standard lot acceptance testing
documents, the operating characteristic curves (OC curve) for
normal inspection, indicate the percentage of lots or batches
which may be expected to be accepted under the various
sampling plans for a given process quality. These OC curves
are normally shown for single sampling; curves for double and
multiple sampling are matched as closely as practicable. The
OC curves shown for AQLs greater than 10.0 are based on the
Poisson distribution and are applicable for defects per
hundred units inspection; those for AQLs of 10.0 or less and
sample sizes of 80 or less are based on the binomial
distribution and are applicable for percent defective
inspection; those for AQLs of 10.0 or less and sample sizes
larger than 80 are based on the Poisson distribution and are
applicable either for defects per hundred units inspection, or
for percent defective inspection (the Poisson distribution
being an adequate approximation to the binomial distribution
under these conditions) . Tabulated values, corresponding to
selected values or probabilities of acceptance (Pa , in
percent) are given for each of the curves shown. These tables
are also given for tightened inspection processes. An example
of a typical OC curve is shown at Figure 7.
23
TABLE XF—TsbUt for ism pi* tk* col* Utttr: F
CHAin F • OPERATING CHUAOBttSnC CURVES FOR Slid SAMPLING KUK
munittMrmiuin I* *»•«••• Mm.vWtw.-i <M l>Ma •*^*WMfeM*.' a >H
ttEI X-f-1 - rASUUTTD VALUES PQR OPERATINC CHmUCTERISTiC CURVES FOR SINGLE SAWLING PIAN5
%
Iiiii tl QmMiMta^MM
its | 11 Ut 4J [ IB J~»« " it (J I » IXI « IX • X B
ibl— Mm.) fcirf— <^i i i^tm
m.i I.MH in i!» «.a in uw in tu Ul t-» KJ nj e.« as SJ UJ aw
Ml IS* IJ1 <* T.lt u • ».a* i.a IJi Ul HI H.I at at ».t «J OJ KJ
»« US 10 1M IB i*t tin us JA1 Ul IU aj ai B.I OJ SJ at J
n» I.4J IM Alt at ."Lt L« ta ut O.T at an ai Ol j Ml MJ Ml
aj 1« • a Ul 111 m IS Ul Ul IM 4 MJ OJ BJ MJ nj MJ Ml
ei «.a tt» U.J MJ j*» m
L
u* r»« BJ SI at MJ HI Ml VJ at OS
m* Ml n.i Mi 4 tlj IU a.< aj nt MJ at •J n* a« Ml IM Ml
».» a« U.S. ai XI tSt a* B7 14 aj at j Itl MJ MJ Mi IB SI
1.1 a* a* MJ m.\ M4 nj u cj •j AS at IU ai IU n M m
u 4< IS a X u U 41 a a X a X M X M X
••MktIB*!
Figure 7 Typical OC Curve for Lot Acceptance Purposes
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3. HELLFIRE Lot Acceptance Definitions and Procedures.
Missile - A missile shall consist of one LBHF High
Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) missile as defined by Missile
Specification (MIS-SPEC) MIS-44430 or MIS-42560.
Test Article - The test article will be a HFLB HEAT
production missile which has been selected for sample testing.
Lot - A lot shall consist of the production quantity
for a given month which has been produced under the same
processes. In all cases, missile lot sizes shall be subject
to the constraints of homogeneity with respect to changes in
the processes, configuration changes, deviations or waived
hardware, etc.
,
which may materially affect performance of the
end item. The Government reserves the right to combine
monthly build lots when necessary/appropriate.
Lot Sample - A lot sample is the quantity of ten
missiles randomly selected from a lot build of 100 missiles or
more which will be environmentally conditioned and then tested
for the purpose of lot acceptance or rejection. Each lot
sample of ten missile is further divided into three subgroups
consisting of lot sample test article numbers 1-4, 5-8, and 9-
10 respectively.
4. Sampling Procedure.
As indicated above, in the case of HELLFIRE, ten
missiles will be randomly selected from each lot build, and
25
shall be delivered to Redstone Arsenal (RSA) , Alabama, for
environmental conditioning and then shipped to Eglin Air Force
Base (EAFB) for the actual missile flight testing. The
Government then shall accept or reject the entire lot of
missiles (which is anticipated to be roughly one month's
production) based on the following sequential sampling plan:
Table 3-1, SEQUENTIAL SAMPLING PLAN.






In addition to the ten missiles selected for testing,
two contingency missiles shall be selected from each lot.
These two contingency missiles will be used in the event that
any of the ten test articles are damaged or otherwise
unsuitable for testing. This will prevent disrupting the test
process if one or two missiles have to be substituted for
these reasons.
Smaller samples shall be selected from lots of less
than 100 units per month (a distinct possibility in the case
of diminishing procurement funding or program stretch outs)
.
The minimum number of missiles to be selected under these
conditions is as follows in Table 3-2 below.
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Table 3-2, SMALL SAMPLE SIZES





The Government shall identify to the contractor
missiles (by serial number) which have been selected for QALVT
testing at the time the missiles have successfully completed
final inspection at the production facility.
After these missiles are identified to the contractor
as test articles, the contractor will then seal the missile
containers with contractor furnished seals, and shipped to RSA
for testing. The contingency missiles may be held at the
contractor facility or shipped with the test articles to RSA.
The missiles selected for lot sample testing shall be
counted as a portion of the deliverable quantity of the
applicable accepted lot. If any seals or containers are
broken, the Government reserves the right to require
replacement of the missile in the lot sample with a
contingency missile. The remainder of the lot of missiles
which have not been selected for testing at RSA, shall be
packed in missile containers and placed in secured storage
until completion of the lot acceptance testing, for which they
are part, is complete. The serial number of each missile for
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each lot shall be provided to the Government at the time it is
placed into secured storage.
Once a selected test article has been identified to
the contractor, no further tests, adjustments, or repairs
shall be performed except as authorized by the Government.
Test articles rejected on arrival at RSA shall be
dispositioned by pre- flight nonconformance procedures. The
contractor shall test missiles at RSA on the HELLFIRE Missile
Compact Test Set (HMCTS) in accordance with procedures
specified in the QAVLT Plan and perform pre- flight check out
at EAFB on the HELLFIRE Compact Firing Test Set . The
Government reserves the right to omit any portion of the lot
acceptance test, including environmental tests, of any or all
of the sample missiles. After Government inspection at RSA,
test articles shall be stored in a Government security locked
area.
5. Flight Testing.
After Government inspection and acceptance procedures
at RSA have been completed and prior to shipment to EAFB, the
lot sample missiles will be subjected to Captive Flight
Vibration (CFV) and one subgroup will be environmentally
conditioned at RSA, in accordance with the lot acceptance plan
and the applicable missile specifications.
Upon completion of these tests and environmental
conditioning at RSA, the missiles will be transported to EAFB
28
for pre- flight and firing per Table 3-3.
TABLE 3-3, TEST FIRING MATRIX
LOT # TEST ART PROFILE MODE RANGE COND.
6n+l 1 INDIRECT LOW LOAL L AMB
6n+l 2 INDIRECT HIGH LOAL L AMB
6n+l 3 DIRECT LOBL M AMB
6n+l 4 DIRECT LOBL M/8° AMB
6n+2 1 INDIRECT HIGH LOAL L COLD
6n+2 2 INDIRECT LOW LOAL M COLD
6n+2 3 DIRECT LOAL S COLD
6n+2 4 DIRECT LOBL M/8° COLD
6n+3 1 INDIRECT LOW LOAL S HOT
6n+3 2 DIRECT LOBL S/8° HOT
6n+3 3 DIRECT LOAL M HOT
6n+3 4 INDIRECT HIGH LOAL M HOT
6n+4 1 DIRECT LOAL M AMB
6n+4 2 INDIRECT HIGH LOAL M AMB
6n+4 3 INDIRECT LOW LOAL S AMB
6n+4 4 DIRECT LOBL S/8° AMB
6n+5 1 DIRECT LOBL M COLD
6n+5 2 INDIRECT HIGH LOAL M COLD
6n+5 3 INDIRECT LOW LOAL L COLD
6n+5 4 DIRECT LOBL S/8° COLD
6n+6 1 DIRECT LOBL M HOT
6n+6 2 DIRECT LOBL M/8° HOT
6n+6 3 INDIRECT HIGH LOAL L HOT
6n+6 4 INDIRECT LOW LOAL L HOT
Where n = 0, 1, 2, 3 , Lock- on can be either
before or after launch (LOBL or LOAL) and Range which will
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be at short (up to 2km)
, medium (2-5) and long (+5) , can
include an 8° offset. Offset is the deviation from the
straight line trajectory that the missile selects (either
right or left) to help it to distinguish the actual target
from possible background clutter. Conditioning (COND.)
represents the environmental temperature conditioning either
at ambient (AMB) , cold (-45 F) or hot (+145 F)
.
The procedures used to conduct the actual firing at
Eglin AFB will be controlled by that installation. Missiles
will be transported, inspected and prepared for firing.
This will involve conducting a test readiness review (TRR)
to insure that all the test requirements, range support,
instrumentation, and safety considerations have been
satisfied prior to actual missile firing.
The objective of this specified missile firings is to
mix two ranges, all modes, offsets, with varying degrees of
difficulty on each block of the four firings so that all
missile specifications will eventually be tested when this
table is completed. There are a few limitations. They are:
1) Only two firing ranges (distances) can be instrumented on
the firing range at one time, and 2) All firing from any one
lot will be performed at the same temperature conditioning for
all test articles. The Government may require the contractor
to fire at any of the conditions in the matrix above or any
combination of conditions that are in accordance with the
appropriate Military Specification (MIL-SPEC)
. Prior to
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firing, the Government and contractor shall confirm that all
firing equipment and associated range equipment are in proper
working condition and calibrated.
6. Scoring.
All test articles shall be scored as either a: 1)
Success, 2) No Test, or 3) Failure, in accordance with the
following criteria.
a. Pre-flight Nonconformance:
Any nonconformance of a test article or to Test
Design Package (TDP) requirements discovered during inspection
(including nonconformances discovered prior to, during, or
after environmental testing of missiles at RSA or pre-flight
checkouts at EAFB) shall constitute cause for failure of the
test article and may be cause for lot rejection. The
following procedure will apply in determining the extent of
further testing on the subject lot:
• Testing of a missile shall be stopped at the point any
failure or nonconformance is discovered and a preliminary
analysis shall be made by the contractor and submitted to
the Government within 24 hours.
• The Government will then determine whether this missile
will continue through test and be fired or whether it will
be failed and returned to the contractor for failure
analysis and future production.
31
• If a missile exhibits a pre- flight nonconformance and the
Government elects to continue testing that missile, that
particular pre- flight nonconformance shall be scored a "no
test".
• If the Government determines from the failure analysis
that the pre- flight nonconformance will or is uncertain it
will have an impact on the flight test parameters, the
missile will be scored a safety or reliability failure as
appropriate.
Based on the preliminary analysis of the pre-
flight nonconformance, the Government and contractor may
jointly elect to continue testing of the lot. A determination
to continue shall not relieve the contractor of the
responsibility to correct the failure condition in all
missiles, as deemed necessary by the Government.
Jb. No Test
A no test may stem from a variety of causes and
sources related to the missile under test or circumstances
surrounding these tests. They will include areas resulting
from:
• A malfunction of equipment other than the test article or
proven post launch environments which causes the missiles




• Failures induced by Government personnel error or failures
induced by errors of those authorized to act for the
Government, either deliberate or inadvertent, or operation
beyond prescribed limits.
• In the event that the contractor aborts a missile launch
and the subsequent analysis proves that the missile did
not experience an anomaly, the missile will be scored a
"no test". The contractor shall pay all retest costs and
the Government will notify the contractor of the
acceptance or rejection of the lot within 45 additional
calendar days beyond the time identified in the lot
acceptance plan.
• Although a failure did not occur, the missile displays a
property not previously observed and is, therefore, of
special interest. It is anticipated that, if left in the
test sequence, this missile will pass all tests and when
launched will fly successfully and hit the target within
the required accuracy thus fulfilling QALVT requirements.
If the missile is permitted to remain in the test sequence
all the way through to a successful launch, the
opportunity to determine the cause of this newly observed
property will be conducted by the appropriate range
personnel. If this occurs prior to launch, a
Government/contract or decision shall be made regarding
further testing of this missile.
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c. Failures.
Failure: Any malfunction (not meeting the no test
criterion) which would preclude the missile from performing
within the requirements of the MIS-SPEC will be categorized as
either a safety or reliability failure as follows:
Safety failures: A lot shall be rejected as a result
of one pre- flight nonconformance or missile firing that
results in a condition that may be hazardous or unsafe as
defined in the Technical Design Package (TDP) or as defined
below. A safety failure will have occurred if:
• A warhead detonates prior to the minimum safe arm
distance from the launcher of 150 meters.
• An inadvertent launch occurs which is traced to a
missile malfunction.
• There is a delay (hang fire) of more than five
seconds between the initiation of the firing
signal and the ignition of the rocket motor.
• Any event that would endanger the launching
helicopter (e.g. major debris thrown in the
area by the missile upon launch)
.
Reliability Failure: Accept/reject criteria for
reliability shall be attributed based on the total number of
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failures. Accept/reject numbers shall be as specified in the
sampling plan (see Table 3-1, Sequential Sampling Plan, pg
26) . A reliability failure shall have resulted when one or
more of the following occurs:
• A missile misses the target. A target miss shall
have occurred if an intact missile does not meet
the accuracy requirements as stated in the
corresponding MIS -SPEC.
• The missile impacts the ground prior to impacting
the target.
• The warhead fails to detonate in accordance with
the timing requirements of MIS-SPEC.
• The warhead detonates during flight due to a
missile malfunction and is not otherwise scored a
safety failure.
• A no-fire occurs. A no-fire is defined as failure
of the missile to fire following application of
the firing signal.
• The missile flies a profile other than that
preset
.
• A pre- flight nonconformance determined to be a




Success; All missile flights not scored as a no
test or failure will be scored as a success. All available
test data and flight hardware debris shall be made available
to the contractor as soon as practical; visual examination of
impact debris and recovery of the maximum amount of missile
hardware debris, that can safely be handled, shall be allowed
prior to destruction of the remainder of the hazardous
components (if deemed feasible by the Explosive Ordinance
Disposal unit (EOD) ) , contingent on approval by the on-site
EOD representatives. Scoring of missile launches as success,
failure, or no- test will be accomplished by the Government.
7. Acceptance/Rejection Criteria.
Acceptance or rejection of a lot is based on pre-
flight inspection and tests at RSA and EAFB and flight
acceptance tests on a sample of missiles randomly selected by
the Government from each lot and scored in accordance with the
lot acceptance plan. In addition missiles will not be
accepted until all waivers, deviations, Engineering Change
Proposals (ECPs) , or other issues affecting a lot are resolved
to the Government's satisfaction.
Upon accepting a lot of missiles, the contractor shall
deliver to the Government all remaining lot sample missiles,
(including contingency missiles) not flight tested. Missiles
which have been disassembled/repaired in failure analysis and
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have been subjected to lot acceptance captive flight and
vibration testing will be made functional, by completing a
functional baseline test at the lot temperature designated at
RSA and accepted for retirement at RSA.
8. Resubmittal Criteria.
Lots which fail to pass the acceptance criteria may be
resubmitted by the contractor unless an alternative plan of
action for the lot acceptance of missiles is agreed upon
between the Government and contractor. Failure analysis will
be conducted and deficiencies corrected from the initial
submittal prior to the resubmittal as described above. A
failed lot may be resubmitted a maximum of two times. All
scoring and rejection criteria will remain the same except for
adjustments made in the quantity of test articles required for
decreased lot sizes.
9. Contractor Liability.
When a lot sample fails the acceptance criteria and is
rejected by the Government or when a lot meets the acceptance
criteria and one or more failures occur, the contractor shall
perform failure analysis and shall submit a detailed report
describing the deficiencies in performances which resulted in
rejection or failure and the action necessary to correct and
prevent recurrence of the deficiencies. The contractor's
report shall be prepared in accordance with the data item
reporting requirements contained in DI-RELI- 80253
.
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In the event of a failed lot, additional lots shall
not be submitted for acceptance until corrective action has
been approved by the Government. Also, testing may be
suspended at the Government's option on any test articles
located at RSA or EAFB.
10. Responsibility for Retesting Rejected Lots.
In the event lots are rejected, any and all expenses
associated with failure analysis, replacement hardware,
rework, reinspection, packaging, packing, handling,
transportation, and retest shall be borne by the contractor.
The foregoing expenses are inclusive of the cost of
replacement of missiles, Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)
,
cost of range operations, environmental conditioning, and
additional failure analysis. With respect to retest costs
assuming a resubmittal of 4 missiles, the contractor shall
reimburse the Government in the amount of $4,000 for each
missile environmentally conditioned at RSA, and $10,000 for
each missile flown in each resubmitted lot test sample. At
the contractor's option and expense, the remaining test
missiles from a rejected lot may be returned to him.
Replacement missiles will be in the same quantity expended in
initial test, retest, and those rendered non-deployable due to
environmental conditioning less the ten (10) missiles
allocated for each lot tested in the acceptance plan and




The contractor representative is responsible for
technical support effort in observing, analyzing, and
supporting program plans and procedures to meet program
milestones and objectives. Additionally, he will coordinate
with other supporting agencies to insure mission support
requirements are fulfilled in a timely manner. The contractor
shall provide a single individual at RSA and EAFB who shall
act as the point of contact for all decisions related to local
test activities. The contractor may participate in all test
mission planning sessions, Mission Readiness Reviews (MRR)
,
data reviews, and/or briefings.
The contractor shall provide all missile round
information and simulation results required to describe
expected flight performance of the missile. This shall
include nominal flight trajectories and expected three sigma
variation bounds of this trajectory. The contractor may
monitor the launch and shall assist the Government in solving
any problem areas which may arise due to missile malfunction.
In case of a suspected missile "failure" or "no
test" the following activities shall be performed:
• The contractor shall perform a failure analysis on any
test article which are suspected failures or "no tests".
Results of this analysis and recommendations for further
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activities shall be prepared in a Failure Analysis Report
in accordance with data item reporting requirements
contained in DI-RELI- 80253 .
• The contractor shall prepare a Corrective Action Plan in
accordance with DI-RELI- 80254 for all failures which
result in the rejection of a missile lot. This plan shall
describe all activities and actions planned by the
contractor to solve the missile failure problem.
Government approval of the Corrective Action Plan is
required prior to implementation.
In the case of a rejected lot, the contractor
shall develop and prepare a plan for lot resubmission in
accordance with DI-RELI- 80254 indicating the scheduling and
activities to be performed to resubmit the lot to the
Government for acceptance. Government approval of this plan
is required prior to implementation.
b. U.S. Air Force.
U.S. Air Force - Range Support Contractor & Range
Support Representative:
The U.S. Air Force Support contractor and
representative is responsible for overall flight range
operations to include Data Acquisition and Control System
operation, test instrumentation, data collection and
reduction, missile ready storage and delivery, environmental
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chamber operation, range security, range safety, conduct of
the countdown from upload to launch, missile recovery
operations, target complex operations, data and documentary
camera operation, laser spot data, and geodetic surveys of
missile impact points.
U.S. Air Force - 46th Test Wing - Test
Engineer/Coordinator:
The Air Force test engineer/coordinator will be
responsible for overall Air Force coordination, management,
and scheduling of resources to support missions on Range C-72,
the Longbow HELLFIRE flight test range.
U.S. Air Force Range Systems Directorate
Representative
:
The Range Systems Directorate formally controls
all test procedures, instrumentation, and software
configuration. No change or variation in procedures or
configuration will be made without prior written approval of
the Range System Directorate engineering representative. All
questions concerning range instrumentation or facility
performance, readiness, and utilization will be directed to
the Range Systems representative.
No information or data generated at the facility
will be released without the representative's Quality
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Assurance review. All requests for assistance or support from
the Range Operation and Maintenance (O&M) contractor shall be
made through this representative. No direction of the O&M




IV THE HARDWARE IN THE LOOP (HWIL) SIMULATION METHOD
A. INTRODUCTION.
As in the case of many areas of Government regulation, lot
acceptance has several underlying requirements that must be
addressed regardless of the methodology adopted to perform the
overall controlling action. This is certainly true for the
Longbow HELLFIRE missile. Since several aspects of HWIL will
not differ much from those areas already identified in the
"Fly to Buy" methodology, only those areas that differ will be
addressed. Therefore, the reader can assume that all other
areas not specifically addressed will remain the same.
B. LONGBOW HELLFIRE HWIL SIMULATION QALVT.
1. Purpose
The purpose of the Longbow HELLFIRE Quality Assurance
Lot Verification Test (QALVT) program is to provide a cost
effective means of determining the acceptability of Longbow
HELLFIRE production missiles while still meeting the specified
missile performance and reliability requirements stated in the
contract 5 .
5 The Longbow HELLFIRE Modular Missile System, Low Rate
Initial Production QALVT Plan, USAMICOM, 23 May 1994, is the
source of information used throughout this chapter.
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2. The QALVT Plan
The Longbow HELLFIRE QALVT plan provides a method to
subject a random sample from a lot of Longbow HELLFIRE
missiles to a nondestructive, environmentally conditioned,
dynamic, mechanical, and functional test through the use of a
Hardware in the Loop Simulation that depicts an electronic
target similar to those that are anticipated to be encountered
under future battlefield conditions. The resulting miss
distance would be the primary performance measure.
3. Definitions.
Missile - A "missile" shall consist of one Longbow
HELLFIRE HEAT missile as defined in the MIS.
Lot - A lot shall consist of the production quantity
for a given month which has been produced under the same
conditions utilizing the same processes.
Lot Sample - A quantity of fifteen missiles randomly
selected from a lot which will be tested in accordance with
the QALVT Plan.
4. Lot Sampling Procedure.
Instead of the ten missiles required for FTB, fifteen
missiles shall be randomly selected from each lot and
delivered to RSA. These fifteen missiles shall have been
previously tested on special inspection equipment, to be
determined (TBD) , and shall have passed all inspections and
tests. The Government may require the identification of all
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of the contingency missile (s).
While at RSA, the fifteen missiles will be tested in
the Simulation/Test Acceptance Facility (STAF) . The
Government will then accept or reject the entire lot of
missiles based on the following simulation sampling plan
criteria described in Table 4-1 below.
TABLE 4-1, SIMULATION (HWIL) SAMPLING PLAN.
No. Missiles
Tested








Procedures for selection and transportation of these missiles
to RSA is basically the same as with the "Fly to Buy" method.
Unless physically damaged in transportation, these missiles
will be determined to be suitable for testing once they have
arrived and been inspected by the Government representative at
the STAF facility. And as with FTB method, the missiles
selected for lot sample testing will be counted as a portion
of the deliverable quantity of the applicable accepted lot.
5. Test Sequence and Pass Fail Criteria.
a. Incoming Inspection.
There is no pass/fail requirement for this test
other than the Government visually inspecting the missile for
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signs of damage due to shipment prior to the actual testing.
Jb. Perform Portable Missile Test Bench (PMTB) Tests.
This is a system pre -check performed by the
contractor utilizing portable test equipment. The actual
portable test equipment that will be used to perform this test
is anticipated to be fielded in conjunction with the missile
system.
c. Perform Limited Vibration Test.
This limited vibration test will be designed to
simulate some of the vibration that the missile system would
be exposed to if it had been actually fired. The levels of
this vibration are to be determined in the future.
d. Missile Preparation.
Missile preparation will consist of removing the
precursor door and installing an electrical harness called a
"pigtail", in order to connect the internal missile guidance
electronics to the HWIL simulator. Additionally, it is
anticipated that an external pneumatic gas line will be
connected to the fin mechanism to actuate it during the
simulation to demonstrate that the fin system is responding
properly to guidance commands. However, in order to
accurately assess this fin response, it would be necessary to
replicate the aerodynamic loading of the fins. This process
is a very difficult task to perform in a laboratory
environment. Because of the difficulty involved, the
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decision as to whether or not this will be attempted has not
been made at this time.
e . Environmen ta.1 Condi t±onlng .
All missiles selected from a lot shall be shipped
to Redstone Arsenal, but only one subgroup will be initially
environmentally conditioned. The environment conditioning
will be for 24 hours. The next subgroup from the lot will not
begin environmental conditioning until the previous subgroup
has been tested and the need to test the second subgroup
established. The contractor may select the temperature for
the first lot; thereafter, the temperature conditioning
sequence will typically continue as follows:
TABLE 4-2, MISSILE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONING.
LOT NO. SUBGROUP SAMPLE SIZE TEMP.























Where n = 1,
2
, 3 . . . .
Once environmental conditioning has been
completed, the missile will be removed from the chamber and
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installed on a CARCO 6 table with shroud. The CARCO table is
a special test fixture that reduces the effect of unwanted
vibration during tests and allows the entire test stand to be
moved within the STAF facility test cell.
f. Closed Loop Electronic Tests.
Six flight test scenarios will be simulated by the
STAF7 . Four scenarios will be against Stationary (S) target
at ranges from 1.5 kilometers (km) to 7.5km. Two of the
stationary target scenarios will be conducted at ranges of 1.5
km and 2.49 km in Terminal Track Acquisition (TTA) and
Terminal Track (TT) modes, both with Precision (P) Hand over
(P H/0) . One will Lock-on Before Launch (LOBL) and the other
will Lock- on After Launch (LOAL) . The remaining two
stationary target scenarios will be conducted at ranges of 6
km and 7.5 km in modes Pre-Terminal Track Acquisition (PTA)
,
Pre-Terminal Track (PIT) , TT and Reduced Radar Cross Section
(RCS) . Both will employ lock on mode LOAL and P H/0.
Two scenarios will be against moving (M) targets
at 6km range and will employ LOBL lock on mode. One will
employ P H/0 with Moving Target Acquisition (MTA) (spotlight)
,
PTT and TT modes while the other employs Non- Precision (NP)
H/0 with MTA (scan), PTT Ground Evaluation (GE),& TT modes.
6 CARCO is the name of the manufacturer who produces this
test fixture.
Specific tasks that will be performed within the
closed loop tests are described in Appendix B.
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These scenarios are outlined in Table 4-3.
The requirement for success is that each missile
shall be tested three times (runs) for each scenario. A
missile must pass two runs out of these three for each
scenario in order to be a success.
The miss distance requirement for each run is 2 x
Circular Error Probable (CEP) requirements.
TABLE 4-3, CLOSED LOOP ELECTRONIC TESTS.
SCENARIO TARGET RANGE LOCK ON H/0 MODES TESTED
1 S 1.5km LOBL P TTA, TT
2 S 2.49km LOAL P TTA, TT
3 M 6km LOBL P MTA spotlight
PTT, TT
4 M 6km LOBL NP MTA scan
PTT, GE, TT
5 S 6km LOAL P PTA, PTT, TT
6 S 7.5km LOAL P PTA , PTT , TT
The general layout of this closed loop test can be
seen at Figure 8 on the following page.
g. Open Loop Tests.
Open loop testing concerns checking other areas of
missile system performance that cannot be performed as part of
the closed loop segment of the HWIL simulation itself 8 .
These areas involve conducting the following tests and tasks:
8 The specific tasks that will be performed within the
open loop tests are described in Appendix B.
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Htrdware-in-the-Loop Simulated Flight
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Figure 8 Closed Loop Test Layout
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• RF Transit Output Test - in accordance with
Longbow HELLFIRE MIS-SPEC-45584 , to within
minus 4 dB
.
• Basic Fin Response Test - This is part of the
PMTB test that will be done prior to closed
loop tests.
• IMS Performance - Move CARCO table and measure
gravity- relative position + 10%.
• Remove shroud and missile from CARCO table.
• Remove pigtail and re- install precursor door.
• Perform PMTB test.
Recertif i cat ion
Recertif ication will be in accordance with
procedures that will be determined at a later date, but
involve insuring that the missile (after completing the lot
acceptance test) is placed back in to the same condition it
was in prior to the start of testing.
h. Resubmi tta.1 Criteria.
Lots which fail to pass the initial testing may be
resubmitted by the contractor unless an alternative plan of
action for the lot acceptance of missile is agreed upon
between the contractor and Government.
Failure analysis shall be conducted and
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deficiencies corrected from the initial submittal prior to
resubmittal as outlined in the contractor's plan for lot
resubmission which will be prepared following the procedures
described in DI-RELI- 80254 . A failed lot may be resubmitted




In the process of analyzing the Longbow HELLFIRE HWIL
Simulation plan and methodology, several key issues regarding
the basic structure and nature of the HWIL methodology come to
light. The first one involves the very manner in which the
test plan is structured. The issue here being whether or not
the concept of Hardware in the Loop testing needs to follow
the traditional structure typified by the FTB methodology or
even the current HWIL version. This is because many of the
reasons for the structure are no longer important to the
outcome. Several factors need to be discussed in view of this
very pertinent statement and for several reasons:
1) Since HWIL does not require destructive testing of the
missile, or its components, the traditional cost saving
procedures described in earlier versions of the HELLFIRE
QALVT or similar sampling procedures need not necessarily
apply to the HWIL simulation.
2) The quantity of test articles needed to perform HWIL
testing need not be limited to just that of a minimum
quantity necessary to provide a desired statistical
confidence that a particular lot is good or bad.
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3) In order to insure that this method actually provides an
accurate assessment of the true nature of the product, a
validation of the system/methodology must be conducted to
substantiate, that the process will provide the desired
information without an increase in the error probability or
that some other undesirable result would occur.
4) Actual missile flights will still be conducted to gather
additional test data and to provide a quality check on the
entire system (to include those areas that cannot be tested
using HWIL, such as the warhead detonation train) . The role
that these missile flight tests will play in the lot
acceptance plan needs to be resolved.
5) How should the contract requirements for lot acceptance
testing be altered to take greater advantage of the cost
efficiency that HWIL simulation could provide?
With these factors and considerations in mind, it seems
prudent that the first step in analyzing the HWIL process, is
to quantify/qualify all of the inputs and outputs of the FTB
and HWIL simulation processes, and that of the Longbow
HELLFIRE missile system that will be tested, and then compare
these results to the factors and considerations described
above. Finally these results should be compared with the
Draft HWIL Simulation QALVT Plan to see what modifications
would be warranted. This process should help provide a basis
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of where or how the current plan could be modified to
accommodate better approaches.
Next a method for validating the HWIL simulation should be
identified or developed.
B. THE TWO APPROACHES.
1. HELLFIRE (Fly To Buy).
The original "Fly To Buy" methodology was designed to
provide an acceptable level of protection for the Government
and an acceptable level of risk to the contractor. This
acceptable level is based on the anticipated reliability of
the system under inspection. In the case of the Longbow
HELLFIRE system, this missile system reliability was
determined to be 0.94, and the acceptable quality level (AQL)
was placed at 0.92. Considering the high cost of the
HELLFIRE missile, the plan was structured to achieve a
decision as to individual lot acceptability at the end of the
least amount of destructive testing. In the case of earlier
HELLFIRE missile systems, this led to the development of the
4-4-2 multi-stage plan described in Chapter III.
This plan can be evaluated via an OC curve that
presents the inherent probability that the lot of missiles
will be accepted based on the test results of the sample of
missiles tested. The OC curve for the original FTB plan is
depicted below at Figure 9.
55






Figure 9 HELLFIRE OC Curve
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Since the prohibitive cost involved in conducting this
type of testing makes it unsuitable, it is safe to assume that
except for the AQL, no other factors are pertinent to the
overall QALVT issue.
2. The Longbow HELLFIRE QALVT Plan.
The Longbow HELLFIRE QALVT Plan, for reasons similar
to the those for the HELLFIRE FTB and the desire to take
advantage of HWIL ability to exercise the missile under all
six of the scenario conditions, has a 6-6-3 multi-stage plan.
This plan has the proviso that each missile will be run
through each test scenario three times and that each missile
is required to pass at least two of the three scenario trials
in order to pass any given scenario. Failure is still
determined by whether or not each missile successfully passed
all six scenarios and whether or not the overall sample
successfully passed the acceptance test. This statement also
holds true regardless of where the acceptance determination is
made, either during the first, second or third stages of
testing. The specific characterisitics of the 6-6-3 plan and
the resulting OC curve, by stage, can be seen in Figure 10.
The other major features of the HWIL QALVT Plan, that
need to be discussed are the scenarios themselves. Because
all of the Longbow HELLFIRE missiles must be run through each
of the six scenarios, one might be concerned that one
particular scenario might be more difficult than the others to
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Figure 10 Longbow HELLFIRE HWIL OC Curve
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pass. If this were true, than the acceptability of the entire
lot might often be based on whether or not this scenario could
be passed by the required number of missiles. To better
understand this issue MICOM conducted a simulation study to
determine to what extent each scenario was more difficult than
another. The results of this simulation are depicted below in
Table 5-1, Closed Loop Electronic Tests.








* Results are given in millimeters
Each scenario was conducted 100 times and the Results column
in the table displays the difference in millimeters between
each scenario and scenario #3. The results are given in
Circular Error Probability (CEP) . Since the intended target
of the Longbow HELLFIRE missile is a tank roughly 2 meters
wide by 7 meters long by 2 meters high, the maximum deviations





When comparing the two plans it appears that the HWIL
QALVT Plan places the contractor at greater risk then the
original FTB. This comparison is given in Table 5-2.
TABLE 5-2, COMPARISON OF PROBABILITY OF ACCEPTANCE.
4-4-2 FTB Plan 6-6-3 HWIL Plan
STAGE #1 0.78 0.70
STAGE #2 0.92 0.84
STAGE #3 0.98 0.94
OVERALL TOTAL: 0.97 0.92
The information depicted in Table 5-2 was based on the
assumption that the missiles being tested in either of the
plans, do in fact, meet the contract system reliability
requirement of 0.94 9 .
In fact, the contractor has noted this increased risk
and has contacted the Longbow HELLFIRE Program Office to
register his concern. He has stated that he is being placed
at greater risk than his previous exposure under former
HELLFIRE contracts utilizing FTB. The PMO's response has been
to take the issue under consideration until such time as the
entire HWIL simulation plan solidifies to a point where a
better determination on this issue can be made. Both plans
9 Dick, R., "Binomial Sampling Plans Compaison", Brief,
January 1990.
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satisfy a requirement to accept the lot with probability
greater then 0.92 when actual missile reliability is 0.94.
Except for the testing cost factor ratio of approximately 7:1
in favor of HWIL, both plans would be acceptable for
Government use.
The only other major area of comparison is the
quantity of the sample size. In both cases the quantity used,
was driven by the desire to make a determination of lot
acceptability after the least amount testing and with the
fewest number of missile test articles involved. The
structure of each plan is basically the same except for the
additional requirement, under the HWIL QALVT, that each
missile must complete two out of three runs successfully for
all six scenarios. This reason might give the impression of
a significant difference. However, the likelihood of a
missile passing one of the six scenarios, given it has passed
one or more of the other scenarios is larger than it would be
if this information were not available. That is, the outcomes
of the scenario's tests are not statistically independent. In
addition, the repeated three trials for each component are not
statistically independent because it is the same missile under
test in all three trials. This is based on the premise that
HWIL testing involves testing only the electronic hardware of
the guidance and control systems and the system software that
run these components. It stands to reason that if these two
components perform reliably the first time, they are more than
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likely to continue to perform appropriately for all the
remaining trials within that scenario.
Thus, the trials and scenarios are not truly
independent of one another as is assumed in the plan. This
independence feature was used to compute the acceptance
probability of 92%. If this factor of dependence is accounted
for in a fairly conservative manner, the true acceptance
probability is closer to 94%. While this number is closer to
the FTB number, it may still represent additional risk to the
contractor. The extent of this additional risk cannot be
assessed without actual test data.
The real issue here is not the number of scenarios,
number of trials, or pass/fail criteria, but the structure of
the test in general. Many different test structures can be
designed and their probability of lot acceptance computed as
can be seen in Table 5-3 Sampling Plan Comparison.
However, what comes to light in the analysis of these
test sampling plan schemes, is that they all are based on the
assumption of multi-stage lot acceptance criteria, which
assumes that there is a underlying desire to make a
determination after the least amount of testing, because of
the high cost that would normally be involved if this were
true. This is not the case for HWIL simulation tests. As
described earlier in Chapter II, the STAF facility can test
about 20 + missiles a month at the same cost to do the 15
missiles in the plan.
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TABLE 5-3, SAMPLING PLAN COMPARISON,
Sampling Plan
(N - Ace - Re j
)
Overall Probability of Acceptance












Note: The ** 6 - - 2 ** indicating the current test scheme.
The 6-6-3 multi-stage HWIL plan still requires all 15 missiles
to be delivered to the Government since there is no way of





Flight testing beyond EMD and LRIP for the Longbow
HELLFIRE missile will consist of firing 4 production missiles
from static launchers, at Eglin AFB, Fl . One missile will be
chosen from each batch of lot samples for each quarter year.
These missiles will have already passed their particular lot
acceptance test in the STAF facility prior to there selection
for firing. Once selected they will be transported to EAFB
and prepared for firing against one of the six scenarios used
in the lot acceptance plan. This flight testing is expected
to provide a quality check on areas of the missile system not
tested under either of the earlier open and closed looped
testing performed at RSA. These areas will include:
1) Rocket Motor and ignition device.
2) Electronic Safe and Arm device (ESAF)
.
3) Warheads and detonation train.
4) The Missile on board batteries.
5) Other Flight related Components not tested via HWIL
testing.
Flight testing will also serve as a quality check and
source of additional information on the HWIL Simulation
process since all flight test missiles will be drawn from HWIL
specimens. However, other than verifying that a test missile
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hits or misses the intended target, there is little means of
effectively gathering useable data from these flight test
missiles. None of these missiles will be electronically
instrumented or outfitted with telemetry devices that could
transmit guidance, trajectory, and flight data back to a
ground station for post flight analysis. The only data
gathering mechanism is the high speed filming from range
tracking devices and the point of impact.
While the need for this testing is not being
questioned, some very real and important questions do exist
that could potentially adversely effect the HWIL lot
acceptance process.
2. Question Areas.
a. Flight Test Significant.
As mentioned above, one missile a quarter will be
test flown at EAFB. At this time there is no particular
plan/guideline to cover or evaluate these flight test
missiles. The sole evaluation criterion will be whether the
missile hits or misses the intended target. Because these
missiles are drawn from samples that have already passed the
HWIL simulation, any failures during these flight tests will
generate a series of unanswerable questions that will be
difficult or impossible to resolve. Such questions as:
1) What specifically went wrong with the missile?
2) Should it have passed the HWIL Simulation and then
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failed to hit the actual target; i.e., is there
a potential defect in the simulation testing?
3) What do these flight test results indicate about
the rest of the missiles in this particular production lot?
4) What needs to be fixed and how?
The first of these questions "What specifically
went wrong?", may never be answered. Since there is no
instrumentation, only obvious failures such as the rocket
motor not igniting or the warhead failing to detonate could be
investigated with any certainty. Less obvious problems
involved in target misses may never be resolved.
"Should it have passed the HWIL simulation and
then missed the target?". Because post flight data are
limited, this question may never be answered satisfactorily.
In fact, this particular question will likely serve to
generate additional speculation in other areas such as
transportation and mishandling.
The third question presents quite a major dilemma,
because the minimum number of missiles necessary to answer
this question is the same quantity that is indicated in the
former FTB plan; namely four missiles per lot. Since there
will be only one missile fired from one of the three lots
accepted during that period, no meaningful inference can be




Finally, the last question on the list represents
the fall out from the other three. This question can only be
answered after decisions are made relating to the other three
questions. However, if some prior thought is not given to
these questions before hand and a course of action taken, then
this area will have to be dealt with after the fact when it
will be potentially more difficult and costly to resolve.
Jb. HWIL Feedback.
It is understood that prior to any actual lot
acceptance testing being conducted in the STAF facility, the
process used by this facility will have to be validated to a
certain level. Once that level is achieved, it will become
difficult to improve on the process, because the source of
data necessary to accomplish this activity; namely, telemetry
instrumented test missiles will no longer be available. It
stands to reason that the more information one has concerning
a population of missiles (data base) the greater fidelity the
modeling and simulation of that missile will be. The same
holds true here. But as of now, there are no plans to build
additional telemetry rounds, since these missiles are
configured with a telemetry package in place of a warhead.
Any retro- fitting of production missiles is not
desirable from two perspectives, 1) it will not be truly
representative of the rest of the lot it was produced from,




Another alternative available to the Government to
improve the HWIL simulation process, would be to allow the
firing of several of the missiles that have been determined to
be not acceptable by the closed loop test only. They could be
taken to the flight test range and fired for the purpose of
gathering additional information and insight into the process
itself. Such a program would help to verify the accuracy of
the simulation. This testing program may not be advisable for
safety reasons, but the ability to confirm the good as well as
the bad missiles would be a valuable feedback tool to improve
the process as a whole.
D. VALIDATION AND CERTIFICATION
1. Background and Requirements.
HWIL simulations have been used on several occasions
to help make lot acceptance determinations. Such systems as
the Army's TACMS and Pershing missiles, and the Navy's
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) have all used HWIL
simulations in some form, but not as the basis for a lot
acceptance process. In each case the validation of these
simulations poses an all together different problem for each
system for different reasons. Validation is concerned with
the fidelity of the model and its accurate portrayal of the
real life event. The procedures required to accomplish this
validation are not always the same because system
68
characteristics and requirements differ so radically from one
to another. The validation process must be attacked on a case
by case basis tailored for the unique characteristics of the
system and the end product.
As of now, there is no set plan to accomplish this
task, but several factors will be key to its successful
completion. They are 1) the determination of the accuracy of
the simulation to its real life counterpart, 2) the inherent
reliability of the simulation to function properly and
accurately portray the proper environment without inducing
additional errors due to defects, anomalies or modeling errors
into the process. In both of these cases, any factor that
would decrement the outcome of this process from the real life
environment that the missile would be subjected too, could be
perceived by the contractor as additional risk to him and be
a basis for an increase in costs and missile price. For
example, suppose the simulation's accuracy was determined to
be 95% faithful to the actual system's characteristics. What
does this 5% difference represent to the two parties involved?
Will it impact on the determination of the acceptability of
the lots under inspection? 2) If the simulation software were
deemed to work properly and produce an accurate result 99% of
the time, the 1% of the time that it did not function properly
could be perceived by the contractor as an additional 1% of
risk he was assuming to perform lot acceptance. This would
represent 1% more lots that might not be accepted by the
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Government costing him additional rework and handling that may
not be justified. Of course, the opposite case is also
possible. The HWIL simulation process might be passing
defective missiles.
No verification plan has been formulated or drafted to
date, but several of these problems have been recognized by
the facility developers. The mechanism requiring each sample
missile to pass only two of three runs of each scenario is an
example of an attempt to reduce the prospect of a simulation
induced error effecting the overall acceptance of any
particular lot.
These examples indicate an area of the Longbow
HELLFIRE QALVT plan that has not been fully covered. One area
that deserves additional attention pertains to what will
happen when a HWIL simulation problem occurs during the
pursuit of lot acceptance testing. Potential concerns in this
area would center around the necessity of restarting that
lot's testing, because it may not be determined if the problem
detected in the missile under test went undetected in all
prior missiles. If so, this would tend to invalidate prior
testing on missiles for that lot. This would likely require
retesting.
2. A Possible Validation Model.
As mentioned above, no specific lot acceptance
simulation has been through the validation process to date.
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However, there have been simulations that have been validated
and certified for purposes very close to that which would
serve the Longbow HELLFIRE system very well as a possible
model for their certification program.
This system is the Navy's Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
(TLAM) , which used a computer simulation called the
Interpretive Simulation Program No. 13 (ISP 13.0).
The ISP 13.0 simulates the TLAM and the environment in
which it operates. It focuses on Block III and Pre-Block III
Operational Flight Software (OFS) execution from power-up to
missile impact.
The plan that the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons
Division (NAWCWPNS) used to certify their simulation involved
a concept by which they performed a comparison of ISP against
accepted standards outlined in the Simulation Management Plan,
Cruise Missile Project Office, July 1988. The certification
includes validation data and verification data. The
comparisons of simulation data with flight data comprised
validation. The comparison of simulation data with previously
certified simulation data (from earlier ISP versions 10.0,
11.0, & 12.03) comprised verification. In the case of ISP
13.0 the validation is performed by comparing its data with
selected test flight telemetry data, and verification is
performed by comparing against MVS-RLS 10 data. The
10 ISP- 11.0 was updated/certified under a new name, MVS
(RLS-1.1), in December 1991.
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Certification Test Matrix described in TABLE 5-4 was used to
perform this function and included all the runs for which ISP
13.0 has been subjected to during certification testing.
TABLE 5-4, ISP CERTIFACATION TEST MATRIX.
MISSILE PLIGHT OPS PLATFORM REMARKS
109C OTL-39 BDV014 SUB-TTL •
109C OTL-78 LDV2 07 SUB-CLS *
109A OTL-45 BNV153 SHIP-VLS •
109D DT-3 BDV012 SHIP-ABL *
109C OTL-38 BDV014 SHIP-ABL •
109A OTL-32 BNV152 SUB-TTL •
109C OTL-40 BDV014 SUB-TTL *
109C TBAR-1 LDV4 00 SUB-CLS • *
109C TBAR-2 LDV400 SHIP-ABL **
109C TBAR-3 LDV400 SHIP-ABL **
109D TBAR-4 LDV4 00 SHIP-ABL **
109C TBAR-7 LDV400 SHIP-VLS **
109D TBAR-8 LDV4 00 SHIP-VLS **
109C DT-1 LDV400 SUB-TTL **
109C DT-1R LDV400 SHIP-ABL ***
109D DT-2 LDV401.1 SHIP-ABL ***
109C DT/OT-1 LDV401.1 SUB-TTL ***
Notes;
*•
ISP- 10.0 validation runs, resulted in provisional
certification for BLK III ISP development.
ISP- 11.0 verification test runs, resulted in
provisional certification for BLK III test
flights.
*** ISP 13.0 validation and verification runs, to be
completed for full certification.
The following parameters were plotted for ISP 13.0
runs from the test matrix above and compared with flight
72
telemetry data for validation, and MVS (RLS-1.1) simulation
for verification. The parameters were:
• Latitude versus Longitude.
• Inertial Altitude versus time.
• Roll versus time.
• Yaw versus time.
• Roll rate versus time.
• Pitch rate versus time.
• Yaw rate versus time.
• Mach command versus time.
• Mach versus time.
• North velocity versus time.
• East velocity versus time.
• Vertical velocity versus time.
• Normal acceleration versus time.
• TOA error versus time.
• Air temperature versus time.
• Static pressure versus time.
• Dynamic pressure versus time.
A typical plot that was developed to perform the
comparison function for the DT1R: ISP 13 . ... Inertial
Altitude, Vertical Velocity, and Normal Acceleration vs
Telemetry can be seen in the right hand column at Figure 11.
The solid line in these graphs represents the simulation
results. The dotted lines are the actual missile telemetry
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Figure 11 Telemetry vs Simulation Comparison
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readings overlaid on the computer simulation graph. Figure 11
also depicts an example of the type of close match the
Simulation Management Board would be looking for during the
validation and certification process. A perfect match would
be both graphs laid one upon the other.
The closer the simulation results (dotted lines) match
the missile telemetry data (solid lines) the more accurate the
simulation would be to the true life event it was modeling.
If this were true for the majority of the parameters being
modeled, and the results were consistent over a number of runs
(simulation matched with flight telemetry data) , then it could
be reasonably assumed that the model was an accurate portrayal
of these events. This is the approach that the TLAM Program
Office is pursuing for their ISP model for the TLAM.
While the missile system attributes may be different
for Longbow HELLFIRE system, the basic procedure to perform
the certification process would be the same. This process is
one of matching a number of simulation runs with
their corresponding flight telemetry data, and then assessing
the results between these two runs.
As with the TLAM Program, an independent Software
Management Board (SMB) could be established to review the data
and determine whether a certification of the simulation could
be rendered.
To implement and control this task, a weapon specific
simulation certification plan and process would have to be
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developed. An example of the process that TLAM used in their
certification effort can be seen in Appendix C. This process
could easily serve as a guideline for Longbow HELLFIRE's
certification effort with some modifications.
3. Summary.
Validation and Certification of the HWIL simulation
represents a significant challenge, but one that can be
solved. The TLAM example is just one possible solution to
this challenge. Further insight into this area can be
obtained through a new book on the process of validating
simulations entitled: "Simulation Validation, A Confidence
Assessment Methodology". This book provides a generic
foundations for describing, assessing, and structuring the
simulation validation process and many of the problems areas
that may be encountered along the way11 .
11 Knepell, P.L., Simulation Validation, IEEE Computer




After analyzing all the pertinent information and data
regarding the Longbow HELLFIRE HWIL lot acceptances plan,
several areas have been identified that may require additional
attention prior to implementation of this test plan. These
areas will form the basis of this chapter and will be
discussed individually in order of importance.
B. BASIS.
In comming to a conclusion several areas stood out as
being of particular importance to implementing the final HWIL
acceptance plan. These areas are:
1) The role of Longbow HELLFIRE missile flight testing, as
it pertains to HWIL lot acceptance testing.
2) The nature and extent of the validation and
certification of the HWIL simulation.
3) How improvements in the process will be achieved.
4) Implications and future use by other systems.
5) Stockpile Surveillance.
1. The Role of Flight Testing.
The role of Longbow HELLFIRE missile flight testing
presents one of the biggest potential dangers to the program
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if not addressed satisfactorily. Here you have a case where
an insufficient quantity of missiles that will have all passed
the HWIL simulation test are taken to the range and fired at
a given scenario target with no attempt at either separating
the results from the simulation or qualifying them with
respect to the simulation. In both cases, given the small
quantity (one missile flight per quarter) it will be extremely
difficult to draw any kind of meaningful conclusion if a
missile should fail to hit its target. Increasing the number
of flight tests per quarter for the first fiscal year should
facilitate the validation of the HWIL simulation. Failure
analysis would be limited to trajectory and film reviews of
the flight, and the specter of whether or not the simulation
was passing on defective missiles could not be easily
answered. The intended role of these flights was to prove out
that non- tested areas of the missile such as the warhead and
rocket motor will and do in fact function properly. The
probability of detecting faults in these non- tested areas is
not very large even when they occur in a significant
proportion (say 15%) of the population of missiles if only
four missiles are sampled per year. The probability, Pd , of
detecting such a fault (if at least one of 4 missile fail)
when 15% of the missiles are defective is:
Pd = 1 - (0.85)
4
= 0.478
The number of tests, n, needed per year to assure that the
estimate, R, of the true successful flight reliability R is
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within one- fourth of a standard deviation of R with
probability 0.9 is approximated by:
n = (1.645) 2 * 4 2 = 43
To be within one-half standard deviation of R with probability
0.90 requires about 10 missiles per year. If R = 0.85, the
standard deviation is (0 . 85) * (0 . 15) = 0.1275. To be within
one- fourth a standard deviation equates to R differing from
0.85 by + or - 0.03, with probability 0.90. To be within one-
half a standard deviation equates to R differing from 0.85 by
+ or - 0.06, with probability 0.90.
2. Validation and Certification.
Validation and certification should be concerned with
what can be reasonably tested and substantiated within the
HWIL simulation test and what cannot. Knowing these limits
and limitations will help determine what modifications to the
entire procedure are warranted. As described earlier in
Chapter V, there are existing programs that have successfully
validated and certified their simulations. The TLAM example
is just one method that has been performed that fulfills this
requirement, and could be used as a model for the Longbow
HELLFIRE validation and certification process.
3. Improvements.
It stands to reason that this is only the first step
in what will be an eventual dependence on HWIL simulations for
lot acceptance. Most improvements to the process will only be
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discovered after the facility is operational and certain
amount of experience has been gained. With this in mind, some
attention should be given to the area of planning for process
improvements now to more easily take advantage of better
methods as they become available.
4. Future System Application.
Other Army programs have been approached about using
the STAF facility on a time sharing basis and using HWIL
simulation to reduce testing costs. This program would
include Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) , the earlier HELLFIRE II,
JAVELIN man-portable anti-tank missile, Brilliant Anti-tank
(BAT)
,
and CORPS SAM. The key factor here is the need to
highlight the necessity of early planning to accomplish this
task.
Longbow HELLFIRE has already demonstrated that it is
much easier to design features into the missile that lend
themselves to aiding the ease of HWIL testing, than attempting
to correct these after the missile design has been locked in.
In the case of Longbow HELLFIRE, the move to HWIL simulation
meant determining an after the fact means to attach the
simulation hook up cable through a sealed access panel in the
missile body. In addition numerous signal and interface
problems and modifications were needed. These requirements
would have been easier to resolve if they had been included in
the original system design to accommodate an HWIL approach.
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Future systems should investigate this area during the design
phase, so that HWIL critical features can be incorporated into
the design.
5. Stockpile Surveillance.
Although, not a part of the Longbow HELLFIRE QALVT
program, an area that warrants attention here because of its
obvious impact, is stockpile surveillance. Normally at a
predetermined time in the storage life of missiles, a certain
quantity of missiles are selected at random from a given lot,
inspected and test fired. This process helps assess
deterioration characteristics of stored missiles and
facilitate the identification of problems that can be
corrected before they continue to degrade the rest of the
stockpile. HWIL simulations may be useful for this type of
testing and may provide substantial savings for the
Government. In addition, some failures could in all
likelihood be traced to a specific component and corrected;
whereas with flight testing, the cause of the failure might
never be determined. With failure modes identified, it would
be that much easier to implement corrective fixes or
incorporate them in future lots or designs.
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VII AREAS OF CONCERN
A. GENERAL.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify potential problem
areas that have so far come to light in this thesis. It is
hoped that these suggestions are viewed as an aid to solving
these problems and not as unsolicited criticism to a process
that is already well along its way to providing substantial
benefits for the Army and DOD.
B. TEE PROBLEMS AREAS.
1. Flight Testing.
Flight testing, as it is currently planned in the Longbow
HELLFIRE program, does not appear to provide significant added
value to the QALVT program. The original purpose of this
testing was to provide a basis to checkout other component
areas of the Longbow HELLFIRE missile system that were not
tested during the HWIL simulation process. However it suffers
from certain major deficiencies that will hamper obtaining any
meaningful results. Because only one missile out of a
possible 250-400 missiles produced during a quarter will be
fired, it will be extremely hard to draw any solid conclusions
from any failures that may occur during these test flights.
Since these test articles will be missiles accepted straight
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out of the STAF testing facility, failures after passing in
those tested areas will be hard to explain if not attributed
directly to some shortcoming in the HWIL simulation test
itself.
There are no easy answers to this problem. Flight
testing is absolutely essential to the process of determining
whether the warhead, rocket motor, safe and arming functions,
as well as the functions that were tested via HWIL are
functioning properly under actual operational conditions. The
crux of this issue is how to relate these tests to the
simulation in a meaningful manner.
2. Feedback.
The HWIL simulation was developed and constructed with
the aide of an extensive amount of actual fight test data and
simulation work within the MICOM Laboratories. Because of
this effort the people involved were able to develop this
process to the point that it can be used for lot acceptance
testing. This effort has been done largely in parallel with
the current Longbow HELLFIRE EMD program. It has taken
advantage of the numerous instrumented missile flight tests to
perfect the HWIL simulation process. But now as EMD ends and
production begins, access to additional sources of future
flight data will not be available for process improvement. As
discussed earlier only production configured missiles will be
flight tested in the future. This will not provide any
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substantial feedback into the HWIL simulation process so that
it can be further refined and improved.
3. Utilization By Future Systems.
As described earlier, a whole generation of future
tactical and operational level missile systems could all
benefit from this type of lot acceptance testing. The
majority of these missiles already surpass the MICOM QALVT
criteria or are very close to it. The major concern here is
|
that these systems need to make decisions about simulation
testing now while still in their developmental stages. It has
already been discovered that as these systems increase in
complexity the need to design in access and compatibility with
simulation testing up front is crucial. Delaying this
activity will only create additional design, interface, and
cost problems.
While this is not a Longbow HELLFIRE specific problem,
the people matrix from the Product Assurance Directorate to
the program office should help disseminate this information to
the rest of the community at large so that these insights can
be incorporated into the next generation of missile systems.
Lot acceptance planning, methods, processes, and procedures
need to be identified and planned for in the early stages of
development.
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PEO Tactical Missiles; Project Manager,
Air- to-Ground Missile Support Project
Office, ATTN: SFAE-MSL-HD, Redstone
Arsenal, AL. 35898-5610
(205) 876-8367
Martin Marietta, Rockwell International,
and Westinghouse.
Longbow is a MMW fire-and- forget Hellfire
missile system. It has an improved range
over the standard Hellfire, and adds the
capability for all weather operations.




Currently in the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase.
Production should begin in late FY94.
Project Manager, Air- to-Ground Missile
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VERIFY TRANSMITTER PULSE SHAPE
VERIFY SEEKER POWER
VERIFY TRANSMITTER CENTER FREQUENCY
VERIFY TRANSMITTER PRF
VERIFY TRANSMITTER FREQUENCY STEPS
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VERIFY INERTIAL MEASUREMENT SENSOR
CLOSED LOOP TESTS
COMPLETE SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY TESTS IN NONDESTRUCTIVE TACTICAL
FLIGHT SCENARIO
INCLUDING:
ACTUAL TACTICAL LINE OF SIGHT RATES,
RANGE EXTENDED TARGETS,
TARGET DYNAMICS,
VARIOUS LAUNCH CONDITIONS AND GEOMETRIES
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APPENDIX C TLAM SIMULATION CERTIFICATION PROCESS
BnusM Onmiiiii Pr»c«»t
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Figure 2 Certification Flow Chart for Effectiveness and Survivability Simulation
CERTIFICATION PLAN APPROVAL
Once a simulation has been authorized for Tomahawk effectiveness ax
survivability analyses the SMB tasks the TWS E&S SCP with scheduling the simulation fi
certification/accreditation. The first step in this process is the submission of a certification plan
the SCP for approval. The certification plan specifies what will be tested, how it will be teste
and what comparisons will be made to reference check cases and other data in the process
certification of a simulation. A basic set of reference check cases are detailed at the end of tb
appendix. These reference check cases allow the responsible organization a media for comparisc
to demonstrate that a simulation is certifiable. Comparison of simulation data to reference chec
case data should be included as the first step in any certification plan. The responsible organizatic
may propose any cost effective combination of the below methodologies to complete certificatio
In order of decreasing priority:
1) Comparison to flight test data;
2) Comparison to other simulations whose certification basis is flight te
comparison;
3) Comparison of data with other certified simulations;
4) Technical audit of simulation performance;
5) Demonstration of simulation capability.
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